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ABSTRACT
Modern service/hosting models utilize the concept of a multi-tenant infrastructure
to share common network services while providing secure logical network segmentation
between tenant customers. An on-going problem with network telemetry tools in multitenant and shared environments is that often they do not provide data confidentiality
between tenants. Presented herein are techniques in which an access policy to telemetry
logs can be generated in a multi-tenant environment through the use of role-based policy
tokens that are attached to log entries as they are received at a collector.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Data Telemetry is an essential part of modern networks. Today, users and
applications are spread across multiple public and private infrastructure domains and/or
clouds and can leverage different underlay and overlay networks. Modern Anything-AsA-Service (XaaS) and hosting models utilize the concept of a multi-tenant infrastructure to
share common network services while providing secure logical network segmentation
between tenant customers.
An on-going problem with network telemetry tools in multi-tenant and shared
environments (such as Netflow and Syslog collection) is that they do not provide any form
of data confidentiality between tenants. Rather, they ensure that only trusted users can
access telemetry data that belongs to just the trusted users or their organization/department.
This makes telemetry data sharing complex and often insecure in hosting multi-tenant
environments (imagine, for example, trying to parse logs for multiple customers who share
the same underlying infrastructure).
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In fact, even within a single Information Technology (IT) department, not all users
may necessarily have rights to view the telemetry logs for all departments and parts of the
network depending on what department a user may be part of, their security clearance level,
and/or compliance regulations.
Today, there are two methods to access telemetry data for customers in a multitenant, hosted, or shared public cloud environment:
1. Telemetry services are provisioned on a per-tenant basis, which is more
secure, but increases overall cost of the service; and
2. Shared Telemetry services for all tenants, which is cost effective, but is
susceptible to the security concerns mentioned above.
This proposal introduces novel method to provide Zero Trust telemetry policy,
ensuring that only trusted users can view telemetry logs in either single or multi-tenant
environments. This method will provide the necessary security to protect end-user data
from attackers.
To realize this method, a Telemetry Policy Service (TPS) is defined in which the
TPS controls the policy regarding which users have access to what types of logs, based on
a variety of criteria, such as customer or tenant identity (ID), location, context, etc. The
TPS is also responsible for issuing tokens to a logging server, which will be appended to
each log entry to correctly identify each log entry so an access/retrieval policy may be
enforced. The TPS has the main function to create and maintain a set of policies
determining who can access what telemetry log entries.
Consider an operational example consisting of the following steps:
Step 1: When a new customer or virtualized tenant network is deployed, the
owner/customer defines a policy identifying whom should be given access to the telemetry
logs for viewing and/or retrieval. For example, log retrieval criteria may be based on one
or a set of conditions, such as:
1. Customer/Tenant ID Policy: A customer/tenant ID policy can be used to
allow anyone with the approved user/group ID to access all logs for a
specific customer or tenant network service.
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2. Location Policy: A location policy could restrict telemetry log access based
on physical or cloud service location. For example, certain countries require
data sovereignty. This function will enable only that certain users be
allowed to view the network telemetry based on locations.
3. Network Function Policy: For a network function policy, users may be
allowed to view telemetry for only certain network functions. For example,
a policy could be generated in which certain users can view only overlay,
underlay, firewall, and/or any other types of network function telemetry
logs.
4. Cloud Service Provider policy
5. Log type: For a log type policy, users may be allowed to access telemetry
matching certain flags (e.g. Facility X, video conferencing traffic, Wi-Fi
associations, etc.).
6. Context: A context poly may be any type of context in addition to those
mentioned above.
Step 2: For each customer/user group and policy entry, the Telemetry Policy
Service (TPS) creates a policy Token. For example, telemetry logs generated by a virtual
firewall service in a Seattle Data Center for a user group network named "IT Admin" could
use three policy Tokens: (1) Tenant Token = IT Admin, (2) Location Token = Seattle, (3)
Network Function Token = Virtual Firewall. The TPS administrator is in charge of the
tokens and can renew, revoke, delegate, etc. tokens. Various example details associated
with Steps 1 and 2 are illustrated below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Example Flow Involving Steps 1 and 2

3
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

6573
4

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3784 [2020]

Step 3: Network devices and services begin sending telemetry log messages to a
collector (e.g. sFlow, NetFlow, Syslog, firewall logs, etc. sent from a variety of network
devices, including switches, hypervisors, firewalls, container service mesh nodes, etc.).
The collector queries the Telemetry Policy Service (TPS) and downloads the policy Token
database to determine which policy Tokens apply to each log entry.
Step 4: As log entries are received by the collector, it appends the policy Tokens to
each log entry as specified by the policy. This has the effect of creating a unique descriptor
for each log entry. A single telemetry log entry may have several tokens appended. In one
instance, the token may act as an access authorization key. In another instance, the token
may act as a decryption key. In some instances, the originating device or service that
generated the telemetry logs may also query the TPS and append the correct Identity
Tokens from the source. Thus, tokens are necessary for this proposal, as tokens allow for
the application of granular policy to the incoming logs. Various example details associated
with Steps 3 and 4 are illustrated below in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Example Flow Involving Steps 3 and 4
Step 5: A user logs into the collector to view telemetry logs. The collector must
now authorize the user on the TPS.
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Step 6: The collector queries the TPS to determine the policy Tokens for which this
user has privileges. The TPS returns the set of policy Tokens.
Step 7: The Collector now parses the log entries and looks for logs entries with the
Tokens for which this user has access. Only logs being requested in which the Tokens
match will be retrievable. Certain users may only be allowed to view specific logs and may
be restricted from others, depending on the policy. If a log entry has multiple policy Tokens,
as shown in Figure 2, above, the user may have to match all of the policy Tokens. Various
example details associated with Steps 5, 6, and 7 are illustrated below in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Example Flow Involving Steps 5, 6, and 7
With regard to protecting the actual tokens, the policy engine is authoritative and
is the only one that can issue policy tokens to either a user or a collection device. Both
users and collection devices must be trusted and authenticated (e.g., using a public key
infrastructure (PKI)) in order to receive or use the policy tokens. Once a token is issued,
it can be protected through various means, such as encryption on a local database, etc. In
addition, the tokens themselves can be randomly generated by the policy engine to limit
being easily predicted. Additionally, in some instances, tokens can be periodically changed
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in real-time by the policy engine to maintain security (e.g., through a communication
between the policy engine and the collector's local policy token database).
In summary, techniques herein provide for the ability to generate an access policy
for telemetry logs in a multi-tenant environment through the use of role-based policy tokens
that are attached to log entries as they are received at a collector.
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